Collaboration strategies of logistics packaging recycling under the context of the dual-carbon goals: A bounded rationality perspective

In the context of the dual carbon goals, reverse logistics plays a crucial role in advancing the circular economy and low-carbon transition. A key operational component is the recycling of logistics packaging, which requires strategic collaboration between logistics enterprises and recyclers. The effectiveness of such coordination directly affects both economic and environmental outcomes. However, existing literature lacks a comprehensive investigation into the dynamic interactions between these stakeholders under bounded rationality. To address this gap, this study draws on prospect theory to construct an evolutionary game model involving logistics enterprises and recyclers. From a bounded rationality perspective, it reveals the dynamic mechanisms behind stakeholders’ engagement in recycling and their mode choices, capturing behavioral traits such as loss aversion and probability distortion. The findings suggest that effective collaboration requires balancing strategic costs and government subsidies. In the system’s mature phase, synergy gains from technological progress and economies of scale can gradually replace subsidies. Rising carbon costs and carbon trading revenues facilitate the system’s evolution toward a stable equilibrium with active recycling and low-carbon adoption. Strategic benefits form the basis for decision-making, while losses from strategy mismatches inhibit collaboration. The model is validated through case simulations, offering theoretical support for policy design and firm collaboration in logistics packaging recycling under the dual carbon goals.