Float Trading for Delay Prevention Using Bargaining Game Theory

A controversial issue in project scheduling is float ownership, the time buffer an activity has before affecting the project completion date. Current common informal approaches, such as “first come, first served,” may unfairly advantage one party and penalize successive ones. Hence, this research establishes a dynamic float trading environment through a bargaining game theory model. This research exploits contract float by focusing on subcontractors who perform the majority of the project’s activities. Firstly, contract float, the difference between the project’s contractual deadline and its finish date, calculated from raw activity durations, is assigned to each critical activity based on a previously researched delay risk model. Afterward, each subcontractor’s confidence level to finish the assigned activity on time is quantified. Moreover, all compatible traders are matched as per the available float. Finally, the value of each individual float is determined, allowing successful trade among the subcontractors. This float trading framework incentivizes positive performance while mitigating the impact of negative performance instead of contractual penalization. With an opportunity for internal float trades, this model maximizes the chance of delivering the project on time or earlier by proposing a float trading solution among the participants.