Pro-citizen rule-breaking among traffic police: the role of rule formalization and peer dynamics

Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) often face a dilemma between complying with formal rules and helping citizens, especially in enforcement contexts. While prior research on public services has focused on prosocial rule-breaking (PSRB), this study conceptualizes pro-citizen rule-breaking (PCRB) as SLBs’ intentional violation of rules to benefit citizens within enforcement contexts where rule-breaking carries professional and institutional risks. Factors influencing PCRB were examined using a vignette-based survey experiment with 733 Chinese traffic police officers, who operate under a dual leadership system shaped by both formal bureaucratic rules and local responsiveness. The results reveal three main findings. First, formalized written rules significantly suppress PCRB compared to informal verbal directives. Second, PCRB cues from peers strongly increase officers’ willingness to break rules in order to help citizens. Third, these peer influences moderate the effect of rule formalization on PCRB, weakening its inhibitory influence. Robustness checks using alternative measures confirm these results. By introducing PCRB into the study of enforcement contexts, this study highlights factors shaping street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making.