Chinese Courts’ New Plea Leniency System: Scrutinizing the Efficacy of Mandatory Defense Counsel

In 2016, China instituted an “Admission of Guilt and Acceptance of Punishment” (plea leniency) system to formalize the legal system’s approach to guilty pleas in criminal proceedings. To legitimize this new justice scheme, it decreed that every accused must be provided with access to legal representation to safeguard the voluntariness and accuracy of the plea. This article examines this mandatory defense counsel assistance and questions the extent to which Chinese lawyers comply with the legislative goal. Based on interviews with 34 lawyers who have served as defense attorneys in Shanghai, it is found that lawyers in plea leniency cases are essentially confined to three peripheral roles—“explainer,” “persuader,” and “observer.” Instead of conducting earnest work in plea negotiations and legal counseling, Chinese lawyers often “collegially” cooperate with criminal justice agencies (gongjianfa 公检法) to urge the accused to admit they are guilty. The findings indicate that the state’s paramount concern for efficiency inherently marginalizes counsel’s bargaining position. Pragmatic considerations also influence the defense counsel’s conduct: a desire to maintain a beneficial relationship with legal authorities and unwillingness to challenge the generally accusatory, draconian, and conviction-centered nature of Chinese criminal proceedings. Overall, plea leniency catalyzes a further emasculated role for lawyers, who function primarily as a mechanical constituent of the country’s increasingly monotonous assembly-line version of criminal justice.