Reputation and Loan Contract Terms: The Role of Principal Customers
Ling Cen, Sudipto Dasgupta, Redouane Elkamhi, Raunaq S. Pungaliya
University of Toronto Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Lancaster University Sungkyunkwan University
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摘要与影响
Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other markets. We argue that one such consequence is smaller loan spreads and looser loan covenants on bank loans, as firms that are able to hold on to principal customers longer are perceived as safer firms by banks. We address causality and endogeneity issues via a variety of tests and find consistent results. Our study suggests that non-financial stakeholders can have important effects on the decisions of financial stakeholders.
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经济 / 管理Corporate Finance and Governance
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Credit Risk and Financial Regulations
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