研究论文
Implementation and Renegotiation
Eric Maskin, John Moore
Harvard University Press University of St Andrews London School of Economics and Political Science
来源The Review of Economic Studies
年份1999
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摘要与影响
摘要 · 完整
The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
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经济 / 管理Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
参考文献 15
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets
被引 103Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Andrew Postlewaite · 1995
Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences
被引 59Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1990
The Theory of Implementation of Socially Optimal Decisions in Economics
被引 41Luı́s C. Corchón · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · 1996
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引用本文 268
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
被引 1,232Jean Tirole · Econometrica · 1999
Corporate Governance
被引 896Jean Tirole · Econometrica · 2001
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
被引 798Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole · The Review of Economic Studies · 1999
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