Strategic Cooperation in Autonomous-Vehicle Delivery Systems for Instant Retail

In this paper, we investigate multi-agent alliance strategies in the emerging “autonomous-vehicle (AV) [Formula: see text] courier” delivery system for instant retail. Motivated by the rapid expansion of instant retail and the widespread industry practice, we develop five game-theoretic decision models that capture the optimal options: a benchmark non-cooperative mode and four cooperative modes among the instant retailer, the AV and courier delivery firms. It turns out that cooperative models consistently yield higher aggregate service levels and market demand than the non-cooperative benchmark. Besides, any member is willing to form an alliance that yields higher joint profit compared with the non-cooperation mode. Additionally, alliance preferences depend on costs: retailers prefer the higher-cost partner to mitigate double marginalization, while AV and courier firms prefer allying with the retailer to increase their decision power. Our results shed light on alliance formation and governance in AV-enabled last-mile systems and provide theoretical guidance for designing cooperative arrangements that improve service performance and economic outcomes in instant retail.