THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
Emilio Calvo, Esther Gutiérrez
Universitat de València University of the Basque Country
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摘要与影响
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.
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经济 / 管理Game Theory and Voting Systems
Game Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
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