TamperBench : Systematically Stress-Testing LLM Safety Under Fine-Tuning and Tampering

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied datasets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To address this, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks, latent-space representation attacks, and alignment-stage defenses; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack–model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model–attack pair. The results provide insights including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that current alignment-stage defenses largely fail to withstand attack sweeps. Code is available at https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench.