From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws
Gabriele Gratton, Luigi Guiso, Claudio Michelacci, Massimo Morelli
UNSW Sydney Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance Bocconi University
阅读操作
确认中在文库中上传 PDF 后可生成中文音频讲解。
摘要与影响
With inefficient bureaucratic institutions, the effects of laws are hard to assess and incompetent politicians may pass laws to build a reputation as skillful reformers. Since too many laws curtail bureaucratic efficiency, this mechanism can generate a steady state with Kafkaesque bureaucracy. Temporary surges in political instability heighten the incentives to overproduce laws and can shift the economy towards the Kafkaesque state. Consistent with the theory, after a surge in political instability in the early 1990s, Italy experienced a significant increase in the amount of poor-quality legislation and a decrease in bureaucratic efficiency. (JEL D72, D73)
逐年被引趋势
关键指标
同类平均 = 1
同领域 · 同年份 · 同类型
Google Scholar 与 OpenAlex 的被引统计范围不同,数值存在差异属正常。
AI 辅助阅读
依据:摘要
可就本文提问;依据不足时会说明。
学术脉络
学科主题
经济 / 管理Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Economic Policies and Impacts · Corruption and Economic Development
参考文献 61
此处列出前 3 条
引用本文 100
按被引量排序,此处列出前 3 条