On the Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights under the Dual-Class Share Structure
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摘要与影响
双层股权结构作为差异化表决权安排的重要形式,打破了传统“一股一权”的股权平等原则,实现了控制权与所有权的非比例配置。这一制度创新在满足创新型企业和科技公司融资需求的同时,也为创始人维持控制权提供了制度通道。然而,当创始股东以少量股份享有超级投票权而中小股东仅持有普通表决权股时,表决权与剩余价值索取权的严重不成比例,不可避免地引发内部监管失序、代理成本攀升等一系列治理困境。我国自2019年科创板引入双层股权结构以来,已有优刻得等企业采用该制度上市,但中小股东权益受损的风险也在持续放大。本文立足于股东异质化理论与委托代理理论,系统分析双层股权结构下中小股东权益受损的表现、成因与制度根源,在比较域外主要资本市场监管经验的基础上,从限制超级投票权边界、强化信义义务、完善日落条款、健全信息披露与司法救济等维度,提出构建中小股东权益保护体系的具体路径,以期在鼓励制度创新与保障投资者权益之间实现动态平衡。As an important form of differentiated voting rights arrangements, the dual-class share structure breaks the traditional principle of “one share, one vote” and equity equality, achieving a non-proportional allocation of control rights and ownership rights. This institutional innovation not only meets the financing needs of innovative enterprises and technology companies, but also provides an institutional channel for founders to maintain control. However, when founding shareholders enjoy super-voting rights with only a small number of shares while minority shareholders hold only ordinary voting shares, the severe disproportion between voting rights and residual claims inevitably gives rise to a series of governance dilemmas, including shareholder oppression, disorder in internal supervision, and rising agency costs. Since China introduced the dual-class share structure on the STAR Market in 2019, several companies, such as UCloud, have gone public with this structure, but the risk of impairment of minority shareholders’ rights and interests has continued to grow. Grounded in shareholder heterogeneity theory and principal-agent theory, this paper systematically analyzes the manifestations, causes, and institutional roots of the impairment of minority shareholders’ rights and interests under the dual-class share structure. On the basis of comparing the regulatory experiences of major overseas capital markets, this paper proposes specific pathways for constructing a protection system for minority shareholders’ rights and interests, including limiting the boundaries of super-voting rights, strengthening fiduciary duties, improving sunset provisions, and enhancing information disclosure and judicial remedies, with a view to achieving a dynamic balance between encouraging institutional innovation and safeguarding investor rights.
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