Informing the Public About a Pandemic
Francis de Véricourt, Hüseyin Gürkan, Shouqiang Wang
European School of Management and Technology The University of Texas at Dallas
阅读操作
确认中在文库中上传 PDF 后可生成中文音频讲解。
摘要与影响
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease’s economic impact on the population, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.
逐年被引趋势
关键指标
同类平均 = 1
同领域 · 同年份 · 同类型
Google Scholar 与 OpenAlex 的被引统计范围不同,数值存在差异属正常。
AI 辅助阅读
依据:摘要
可就本文提问;依据不足时会说明。
学术脉络
学科主题
社会科学Communication and COVID-19 Impact
Game Theory and Applications · COVID-19 epidemiological studies
参考文献 38
此处列出前 3 条
引用本文 52
按被引量排序,此处列出前 3 条