In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?
Nicole Immorlica, Yash Kanoria, Jiaqi Lu
Yale University Microsoft Research New England (United States) Columbia University Chinese University of Hong Kong
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摘要与影响
When Learning About a Match Stalls the Market In many matching markets, participants must investigate whether a match is feasible. When inspection is costly, participants may delay investigating a potential match until both sides have effectively committed. Such caution can cause each side to wait for others to act, creating an “information deadlock.” In their article, “In Which Matching Markets Do Costly Compatibility Inspections Lead to a Deadlock?” Immorlica, Kanoria, and Lu study this problem in random two-sided markets. They characterize how deadlock depends on the market balance, market connectivity, and the chance that inspections succeed. Using statistical physics tools, their analysis identifies phase transitions between deadlock-free and deadlocked markets. The findings offer design guidance: More choice is not always better; match rates are highest at the deadlock phase boundary; and parallel inspections and clearer participant differentiation can reduce the extent to which waiting chains stall the market.
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