研究论文
Job Market Signaling
Michael Spence
Harvard University Press
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摘要与影响
摘要 · 完整
1. Introduction, 355. — 2. Hiring as investment under uncertainty, 356. — 3. Applicant signaling, 358. — 4. Informational feedback and the definition of equilibrium, 359. — 5. Properties of informational equilibria: an example, 361. — 6. The informational impact of indices, 368. — Conclusions, 374.
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Economic theories and models · Economic Growth and Productivity
参考文献 2
Higher education as a filter
被引 5,132Kenneth J. Arrow · Journal of Public Economics · 1973
Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution
被引 780Michael Spence · Journal of Economic Theory · 1974
此处列出前 3 条
引用本文 15,741
Varieties of Capitalism
被引 8,570Hall, Peter A. 1950-, Soskice, David W. 1942- · 2001
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment
被引 6,394Brian L. Connelly, S. Trevis Certo, R. Duane Ireland · Journal of Management · 2010
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
被引 5,054Michael Rothschild, Joseph E. Stiglitz · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1976
按被引量排序，此处列出前 3 条