Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
Jonathan Eaton, Gene M. Grossman
University of Virginia Princeton University
阅读操作
确认中在文库中上传 PDF 后可生成中文音频讲解。
摘要与影响
We analyze the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly, and characterize optimal intervention under a variety of assumptions about market structure and conduct. When all output is exported, optimal policy with a single home firm depends on the difference between foreign firms' actual responses to the home firm's actions and the responses that the home firm conjectures. A subsidy often is indicated for Cournot behavior, but a tax generally is optimal if firms engage in Bertrand competition. If conjectures are “consistent,” free trade is optimal. With domestic consumption, intervention can raise national welfare by reducing the deviation of price from marginal cost.
逐年被引趋势
关键指标
同类平均 = 1
同领域 · 同年份 · 同类型
Google Scholar 与 OpenAlex 的被引统计范围不同,数值存在差异属正常。
AI 辅助阅读
依据:摘要
可就本文提问;依据不足时会说明。
学术脉络
学科主题
经济 / 管理Global trade and economics
Merger and Competition Analysis · Global Trade and Competitiveness
参考文献 6
此处列出前 3 条
引用本文 1,282
按被引量排序,此处列出前 3 条