Pricing Decisions and Financing Strategy Selection for a Capital-Constrained Green Supply Chain with Government Subsidy Pledge

Under the global carbon neutrality strategy, green transformation poses significant financial challenges for manufacturers, particularly due to delayed government subsidy disbursements. This study examines a two-echelon green supply chain where a capital-constrained manufacturer utilizes the Uncollected Financial Subsidy Receivable (UFSR) as collateral for financing. Assuming risk-neutral supply chain members, we develop a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to analyze four financing scenarios: no financing, pure subsidy pledge financing, and two hybrid strategies combining subsidy pledges with bank loans or trade credit. Our analysis reveals that the manufacturer’s optimal financing strategy depends critically on its initial capital level and financing costs, with pure subsidy financing being preferable under moderate funding gaps and lower pledge interest rates. The results demonstrate threshold effects where strategy dominance shifts. Furthermore, increasing the subsidy rate consistently enhances product greenness and consumer surplus, whereas its impact on government utility follows an inverted U-shape under certain conditions. These findings provide a theoretical basis for enterprises to optimize financing decisions and for policymakers to design efficient subsidy mechanisms.