Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences
Lawrence B. Solum
University of Virginia
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摘要与影响
Could an artificial intelligence (AI) become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. First, putting the AI debate in a concrete legal context acts as a pragmatic Occam’s razor. Second, and more controversially, the people can view the legal system as a repository of knowledge—a formal accumulation of practical judgments. Is artificial intelligence possible? The debate over this question has its roots at the very beginning of modern thought about the nature of the human mind. The classical discussion of the idea of legal personhood is found in John Chipman Gray’s The Nature and Sources of the Law . The responsibility objection focuses on the capability of an AI to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. In considering the various objections to constitutional personhood for an AI, the people have been making the assumption that the AI could pass a strong version of the Turing Test.
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社会科学Artificial Intelligence in Law
Law, AI, and Intellectual Property · Legal Education and Practice Innovations
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