Formal Security Analysis of the Olvid Messenger
Noemi Terzo, Cas Cremers, Ruben Gonzalez, Peter Schwabe, Yuval Yarom, Zhiyuan Zhang
Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy Helmholtz Center for Information Security Agpyme (Spain) Radboud University Nijmegen
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This is the artifact for the paper "Formal Security Analysis of the Olvid Messenger" by Noemi Terzo, Cas Cremers, Ruben Gonzalez, Peter Schwabe, Yuval Yarom and Zhiyuan Zhang. The paper provides a first formal security analysis of the cryptographic core of the Olvid secure messaging app. The formal analysis was conducted using the Tamarin prover. The artifact contains a Docker image for the Tamarin protocol models and proofs, as well as the source code to replicate the proof-of-concept for the timing side-channel attack.
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